The ''new converging technologies'' refers to the prospect of advancing the human condition by the integrated study and application of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and the cognitive sciences Á or ''NBIC''. In recent years, it has loomed large, albeit with somewhat different emphases, in national science policy agendas throughout the world. This article considers the political and intellectual sources Á both historical and contemporary Á of the converging technologies agenda. Underlying it is a fluid conception of humanity that is captured by the ethically challenging notion of ''enhancing evolution''.
we can hope to rationalize human behaviour? Can we, in short, create a new science of Man? (Weaver, quoted in Morange 1998, p. 81) If we disregard the somewhat dated preoccupation with sex, glands and vitamins, the rhetoric might have come from the 2002 NSF document. In particular, the author of the 1934 statement, Warren Weaver, envisaged the field he coined as ''molecular biology'' to be fixated on the phenomena of life at the edge of quantum indeterminacy, but still within the range of classical mechanics. Thus, we should come to perform very fine-grained positive interventions into organisms without disrupting their systemic functions. This is precisely where the magic of nano-biotechnology is supposed to lie today.
To be sure, the Rockefeller Foundation and the NSF have operated under somewhat different sociological conditions. Weaver was inclined to treat the still-novel Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle as a temporary barrier to the human mastery of microphysical reality rather than an insurmountable obstacle to our understanding of nature. His encouragement of the influx of physicists and chemists into biology was designed to demonstrate this point. By contrast, whilst the NSF document's principal author, Mihail Roco, may harbor similar views, a more pressing policy concern is the decline in employment prospects and, more recently, academic enrolments in physics and chemistry, in the light of post-Cold War shifts in scientific demand Á not only in the United States. Science journalists have been especially sensitive to this ''re-branding'' exercise.
Consider this analysis: 2 In March [2003] , the Royal Institution (RI) in London hosted a day-long seminar on nanotech called ''Atom by atom'', which I personally found useful for hearing a broad cross-section of opinions on what has become known as nanoethics . . . First, the concern was raised that what is qualitatively new about nanotech is that it allows, for the first time, the manipulation of matter at the atomic scale. This may be a common view, and it must force us to ask: how can it be that we live in a society where it is not generally appreciated that this is what chemistry has done in a rational and informed way for the past two centuries and more? How have we let that happen? It is becoming increasingly clear that the debate about the ultimate scope and possibilities of nanotech revolves around questions of basic chemistry . . . The knowledge vacuum in which much public debate about nanotech is taking place exists because we have little public understanding of chemistry: what it is, what it does, and what it can do.
In short, we may be living in an age when Weaver's ambitions are being revisited to good effect by CT, albeit in the spirit of regaining lost advantage and perhaps even lost collective memory of that advantage, all historical spurs to entrepreneurship (Brenner 1987) .
Returning to the present: what is at stake in the difference between the United States and EU stances on the CT agenda? In a nutshell, the US strategy aims at leveraging shortterm practical breakthroughs in nanotechnology into a long-term basic research agenda in which nanotechnology would enable revolutions in biotechnology, information technology and, most ambitiously, cognitive science. This is encapsulated as the ''NBIC'' vision of CT. Underlying this vision is the idea that ''nano'' (i.e. a billionth of a metre) is the smallest manipulable level of physical reality that does not incur quantum indeterminacy. Molecular interventions at this so-called ''edge of uncertainty'' can be employed to, say, clear the arteries or repair nerves. Seen in their own terms, as developments within chemistry, these interventions are merely incremental improvements, but what matters are the research opportunities these improvements open up in other fields once they are applied. The sense of ''convergence'' in CT here clearly implies a general history and philosophy of science in which developments in nanotechnology act as a tipping-point for revolutionary change throughout science and technology.
By contrast, the EU strategy discusses CT in more modest terms, allowing for multiple convergences amongst different disciplines. Indeed, it is ultimately less concerned with the future direction of science than with what Joseph Schumpeter meant by ''innovation'', i.e. the conversion of an invention into a successful market product. The background assumption here is that the scientific community does not provide sufficient incentive to exploit the full social and economic benefits of its new ideas. Under the heading of CT, the EU proposes incentives to break down cross-disciplinary barriers so as to allow new ideas to be marketed more effectively. At the same time, the EU sees itself in a more regulatory role. Where the US initiative calls on both the state and business to reinforce alreadyexisting trends in nanotechnology, the EU initiative much more explicitly concerns the reorientation of scientists'' behavior from their default patterns to what the 2004 EU report edited by philosopher Alfred Nordmann (2004) called ''shaping the future of human societies''.
What might be called the ''dark side'' of the idea of convergence consists of research alternatives that are implicitly eliminated Á what economists call ''opportunity costs'' Á as research trajectories are encouraged to come together. Here, too, we see a difference between the US and EU approaches. There are two general ways of conceptualizing this progressive elimination of alternatives: one involving positive, and the other negative, feedback loops. Whereas there are examples of both types of feedback loops in the interviews and the policy documents, generally speaking, the US CT strategy is given more to positive feedback loops, and the EU CT strategy more to negative feedback loops. In a nutshell, the distinction is as follows:
. Positive Á only certain strands of research provide increasing returns on investment, which in turn attract subsequent resources to those established paths. Here policymakers see themselves as simply adding forward momentum to convergences which are already taking place, however tentatively (Arthur 1994) . . Negative Á here research futures are conceptualized as much more open, which means that policy-makers play a greater role in steering researchers in the direction of various desirable convergences that might not otherwise take place, actively discouraging, say, more traditional monodisciplinary research.
The difference between feedback loops reflects the extent to which CT policy-makers see themselves as moving with or against the default patterns of scientific inquiry. In many instances, this difference may turn out to be more rhetorical emphasis in the formulation of policy statements. However, matters of substance may also be at issue.
CT through positive feedback loops
The US CT stress on positive feedback occurs on two levels: in terms of (1) the strategy used to chart NBIC advances; and (2) US responses to those developments. Let us take each in turn.
(1) Largely through the initiative of Ron Kostoff at the Office of Naval Research, the US government has invested significantly in ''literature-assisted discovery'', which uses bibliometrics to chart rapidly expanding fields in order to anticipate the next stage in a research trajectory, which oneself or one's competitors may be better positioned to perform (Kostoff 2005) . The motive for this investment has been the rapid growth of China's involvement in nanotechnology, making it the world's leader in terms of the sheer quantity of research published. However, the quality of the research is still in question, at least as measured by the quality of the journals where this research is published. However, that, too, is improving, as Chinese authors form an expanding portion of those publishing in Western nanotech outlets (Kostoff 2006) . The US strategy is to keep constant the goals of CT in terms of ''improving human performance'', but remain open-minded about the exact means by which science should meet those goals Á that is, by whatever research trajectories happen to bear fruit, which, in turn, can be used to leverage further basic research. The implication here is a very strong faith in science's capacity to turn up something that will be to humanity's benefit. (2) The United States appears willing to let the Chinese strike out in many different nanotech directions, whereas the United States develops ''pipelines'' to take maximum advantage of whatever breakthroughs are made. Two pipelines promoted by Roco at the NSF are particularly relevant: (a) the Integrative Graduate Education and Research Traineeship Program (IGERT), whereby PhD students are subsidized to work on CT-related projects to counter the department-based allocation of scholarships for doctoral training, perhaps ultimately breaking down the default disciplinary basis for the reproduction of academic knowledge. At a cognitive level, IGERT aims at enabling students to think in terms of CT at the outset of their careers rather than be forced to synthesize different disciplinary agendas later. A suggested consequence of IGERT is that the next generation of scientists will be more instinctively sensitive to market-driven concerns. (b) The Industrial Research Initiative (IRI), whereby US companies develop ''CT platforms'', i.e. research facilities that allow for the speedy development of new NBIC-based products. Roco contrasts this ''fast but focused'' view of CT's future with that of the more ''science fictional'' approach associated with Drexler and Kurzweil. IBM and Intel, for example, are investing in CT to find cheaper substitutes for the current electron charge basis of information transmission.
These pipelines are to be facilitated by increased national funding (perhaps with matching corporate sponsorship) for research designed to ''reverse engineer'' the brain to enable the more efficient uptake of new knowledge by the appropriate sensory-motor modalities and cognitive faculties. Financial matters aside, the main obstacles to making advances in these areas may be more ethical than technical: the potential so-called enhancement technologies will probably develop faster than public willingness to test and use them. However, let us suppose the pipelines proceed as planned. One unintended negative consequence may be major short-term economic dislocation (i.e. unemployment, company closures, investment losses, loss of productivity), as nanotechnology becomes a ''general purpose technology'' (GPT), whose innovative and improving cross-sector pervasiveness effectively restructures the entire economy. Such a system realignment occurred in the 1970s and 1980s when information technology became a GPT. However, at this point the evidence is inconclusive, especially since so much nanotechnology simply extends research in existing fields under a different heading (Youtie et al. 2008, Helpman and Trajtenberg 1994) .
CT through negative feedback loops
On the negative feedback side, consider the European Commission communiqué. ''Nanosciences and nanotechnologies: an action plan for Europe, 2005Á2009'' (''NN''), which opens with the concern that European scientists are not sufficiently ''entrepreneurial'' in the strict Schumpeterian sense of converting inventions into innovations, i.e. taking their ideas to the marketplace. NN goes on to propose various measures to ease the commercialization of nanotech innovation, including the harmonization of patent standards and the monitoring and publication of innovation waves. NN also makes a larger and subtler move. It implicitly redefines ''scientific creativity'' to mean the sort of mindset that sees the commercial potential in new knowledge. Accompanying this definition there is a general proposal for reforming science education to bring it closer to the business mentality that blurs the distinction between a university department and a corporate R&D division. Whilst NN clearly aims at advancing the CT agenda by counteracting scientists'' default tendencies, some of them quite deep, it is unclear as to what extent these tendencies are simply institutional or personal. The original 2002 NSF report has had a demonstrable impact on the scholarly literature, decisively amending the default meaning of the phrase ''converging technologies''. 3 The various EU responses, starting with Nordmann's 2004 report, have had much less impact, and usually only as a critique of the original NSF report. A survey of the phrase in the titles, abstracts and keywords of publications included in the Web of Science and Google Scholar revealed its pre-2002 occurrence mainly in two contexts. One was in the literature on ''management information systems'' and ''knowledge management'', where CT pertained to the integration of information sources as a key to business efficiency. The other context was multimodal educational delivery systems that encouraged ''interactive'' and ''distributed'' learning regimes centered on student needs and interests. However, after 2002, the use of CT shifted to the scientific project envisaged in the NSF report, though often retaining some of the pre-2002 connotations. Thus, bioinformatics is now often highlighted as a knowledge management strategy for achieving CT, while CTdriven breakthroughs may enable more effective educational delivery systems that reflect and facilitate the brain's capacity to process information.
Lurking beneath differences in wording, the alternative US and EU versions of CT tap into radically different sensibilities that are somewhat befuddled by euphemisms. In the US case, the phrase ''improving human performance'' can be narrowed down to refer more explicitly to a project of enhancing individuals by making them Á and their offspring Á smarter, stronger, etc. This project presupposes an interpretation of biological evolution that might be expedited to the overall benefit of the species by interventions at the level of individual members of the species. In the EU case, the phrase ''shaping future societies'' suggests a more holistic and less invasive approach that focuses on enabling people to live more sustainable lives, where the state or some inter-state authority like the EU is seen as the protector of social equilibrium. In terms of the contemporary ecological politics to be elaborated in the following, the US approach is proactionary and the EU approach precautionary.
However, both approaches contain ambiguities. In the US case these center on the meaning of a term like ''improvement'' or ''enhancement''. Is the reference here simply to systematically induced changes in, say, genetically-controlled behavior or neural circuitry, regardless of their results? Or is it also sought to imply that these changes are always, or even largely, beneficial? After all, a likely long-term consequence of a US-style improvement policy is an increase in people's willingness to make risky interventions at the genomic or neurophysiological level. Yet given the complexity of the contexts in which such interventions would occur, their exact efficacy, let alone relative benefit, vis-à-vis nonintervention would be difficult to assess. Under these circumstances, an implicit goal of the US approach must be for people to see their bodies as sites of experimentation.
In the EU case, the ambiguities center on its attitude towards ''marketization''. On the one hand, the EU clearly wants to remove barriers to the promotion of CT-related innovations that have been erected within, but also imposed on, academic research. The former refers to the legitimization of inquiry in narrowly disciplinary terms, the latter to legal restrictions on the pursuit of intellectual property rights by public institutions. This is a problem that the United States resolved by enacting the BayhÁDole Act in 1980 (Greenberg 2007) . On the other hand, the EU clearly has a protective attitude towards the public to be exposed to the innovations unleashed in such a liberalized economic environment. It would then seem that increased openness to the marketing of innovative products is to be matched by increased monitoring and, possibly control, of their employment. This is likely to result in conflicts in the legal system, as both producers and consumers each assert their enhanced sense of ''rights''. It will be suggested below that, unlike the United States, the EU retains a response mode characteristic of the first crisis of the welfare state as it tries to deal with the second one.
On the level of political economy, the CT agenda may be seen as a ''technological fix'' for the second of the two fiscal crises of the welfare state which have affected both sides of the Atlantic. The first fiscal crisis occurred in the 1970s, with the increasing tax burden on individuals and businesses to finance wider state coverage of welfare needs. Since this problem was predicted to escalate as more countries reached the standards of living enjoyed by the developed world, calls were made to restrict population growth via mass contraception and perhaps even some form of reintroduction of eugenics, especially in the developing world (though ''zero population growth'' was portrayed as an ideal in the developed world). What is of interest here is that this technologically-oriented solution diagnosed the problem, in Malthusian fashion, as one of overconsumption. However, in retrospect, the end of the first fiscal crisis was brought about not by the proposed technological fix, but the weakening of welfare-state coverage in the name of ''neoliberalism''.
The second fiscal crisis of the welfare state, dating from the 1990s, concerns the anticipated financial burden on the pension system of people living longer after retirement. CT is relevant to this development, as it promises Á in both its US and EU guises Á a longer period of labor productivity, expanding the economy in general and deferring the need for individuals to draw on pensions. Note that this problem arises in the context of relatively stable, or stabilizing, population growth rates. This second fiscal crisis is diagnosed, in Ricardian fashion, as one of underproduction. This shift from overconsumption to underproduction is interestingly reflected in the role played by ecological considerations in each. In the former case, nature provides an ultimate, irreversible barrier, resulting in a precautionary principle. In the latter, nature is a constraint that can be strategically manipulated, resulting in a proactionary principle. 4 Indicative of the latter position is the prospect that nano-machines might someday, and perhaps regularly, reverse the effects of industrial pollution in a ''cake and eat it'' scenario. This helps to explain the attraction of the CT agenda in the rapidly industrializing economies of India and China (Kostoff et al. 2007 ).
Defining ''convergence'' in converging technologies: ontological leveling For technologies to converge, they must do something more than simply engage in ''synergy'' or ''multi-'', ''inter-'' or even ''transdisciplinarity''. Whereas the convergence of technologies may produce ''emergent technologies'', in the sense of innovations that could not have been made without the convergence, technologies may also ''emerge'' as byproducts of the normal development of a single technology. In terms of these nuances, US policy documents are much more explicitly committed to convergence than EU ones. In the EU context, extended collaboration between two disciplines is ranked as ''convergence''. 5 In particular, BIO'INFO and, more recently, NANO'BIO tend to be targeted as the pairs with the most potential for research and development. 6 However, again unlike the US case, there is little talk of forward momentum towards a convergence of many disciplines in the promotion of some overarching goal. Instead, the EU model seems to be based on a modified ''finalizationist'' model, which presupposes that disciplines have reached a certain level of maturity enabling them to be steered towards collaboration for socially beneficial purposes.
At the most basic level, the idea of converging technologies presupposes that multiple technologies are coming into increasing, but also more focused, interaction. The idea stops short of positing a specific target, but it does contain the idea of an outer limit that somehow demarcates the interaction. This point of definition is illustrated in three cases where ''convergence'' has a specific meaning in the arts and sciences:
. In art history, linear perspective is defined as convergence in lines of composition towards a vanishing point on the horizon. The result is to give a sense of finiteness to a pictorial image that would otherwise appear open-ended and disorienting (Heelan 1983 , Feyerabend 1999 . . In the philosophy of nature, there is a theory of ''convergent evolution'', derived from Jean-Baptiste Lamarck and associated with the heretical Jesuit paleontologist, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. He predicted that, through increased interbreeding and other forms of communicative interaction, human biological differences would be overcome and we would end up turning the earth into a single ''hominized substance' ' (de Chardin 1961) . . In the philosophy of science, there is a theory of ''convergent scientific realism'' associated with the US pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce. His idea was that, through a fallible process of successive approximation, scientists starting with disparate theories eventually arrive at an account of reality that commands the widest possible assent over the widest range of propositions (Laudan 1981).
As the above examples illustrate, ''convergence'' implies that formerly distinct lineages come to lose some, if not all, their differences in a moment of synthesis. This is much stronger than the simple idea that different disciplines share some things in common. For convergence, such commonality must also induce the disciplines to see their interests as more closely aligned, so that they come to orient their patterns of work to one other. The recent history of the sciences most closely connected to the CT agenda offers some templates for the move to convergence.
. The development of X-ray crystallography in the 1940s first enabled the mass migration of physicists and chemists to biology, resulting in the revolution in molecular biology associated with the discovery of DNA. The value of this technique was the clear visualization of phenomena it afforded, most popularly in the double helix structure of DNA. This, in turn, decisively shifted biology's intellectual center of gravity from the field to the laboratory, drawing together biology's disciplinary horizons with those of the physical sciences. The physical scientists most attracted by this move also tended to be undeterred by the ''randomness'' of nature, be it in the sense of quantum mechanics or genetic variation. They treated life essentially as an engineering project. CT arguably attempts to repeat this movement by enabling people trained in physics and chemistry, fields now subject to declining enrolments and research funding, to migrate to ''nano-bio'' fields. . In the 1950s, a similar development occurred with respect to linguistics, formerly also an archive and field-based subject based on philology and anthropology. Once a critical mass of data had been gathered on the world's languages, people trained in mathematics and the nascent field of computer science (often under the guise of ''information and communication theory'') analyzed the sound patterns and grammatical structure of utterances, first in purely statistical terms, but later in an attempt to identify ''universal'' formal properties. Here the seminal convergence moment occurred when Noam Chomsky, one such mathematically trained (and philosophically informed) linguist, turned the tables on his teacher Zellig Harris by arguing that mathematics could go beyond providing an analytic tool to reveal the ''deep structure'' of language, the so-called universal grammar that came to be associated with the still larger convergence of ''cognitive science'' by the late 1960s. . In the past half-century, computer simulation has become a lingua franca for an increasing number of scientific disciplines, enabling the translation and integration of phenomena gathered from disparate sources into a common ''virtual reality'' that is projectible and manipulable along several spatial and temporal dimensions (Galison 1987 , Mirowski 2002 . Perhaps the most notable site of convergence here has been bioinformatics, whose innovations in information storage and retrieval allow researchers to pool and share results relating to the testing of various molecular combinations for their bio-medically relevant consequences. In this context, genetic information is treated as literally, not metaphorically, digital.
All of these developments have served to remove traditionally discipline-based barriers to scientific communication. In this respect, they provide one of the preconditions for convergence, i.e. the intensification of interaction between researchers. Yet they also point to a deeper meaning of convergence: i.e. disciplines are regarded in discursive rather than ontological terms. In other words, they are distinguished more by the language they use than the reality they access. Thus, in various cases, the distinction between literal and metaphorical language falls by the wayside. On the one hand, the carbon-based molecular structure of bionic computers enables problems to be solved that have eluded traditional silicon-based computers (Adleman 1994) . On the other hand, the structure of DNA itself has been used as the template for the computer architecture (Chang 2003) . Generally reflective of this blurred distinction between the model and the modeled has been the field of artificial life, which over the past 10 years has shifted its research interest from simulating to instantiating life. The implication here is that carbon-based ''wetware'' of flesh-and-blood organisms is no longer regarded as the ''real'' or ''natural'' form of life that ''software'' (i.e. computer programs) and ''hardware'' (i.e. robots) simulate to varying degrees. Instead, life is defined in terms that are completely abstracted from its mode of realization, so that wetware, software and hardware all instantiate ''life'' in exactly the same sense (Amos 2006) .
The language of ''instantiation'' derives from theological discourses of the Christian deity's triune nature, i.e. the idea that God is subject to three equally divine manifestations: Father, Son and Holy Spirit. These theological roots go beyond historical curiosity to a general principle of Biblical interpretation that provides a precedent for reducing, if not erasing, the differences between processes, entities and interventions of ''artificial'' and ''natural'' origin. This principle, associated with what the fourteenth-century scholastic John Duns Scotus called the ''univocity of being'', takes humanity's creation ''in the image and likeness of God'' rather literally, in that human differs from divine creation only in degree, not kind (Fuller 2008, chap. 2) . God may be infinitely more powerful than us, but he works in largely the same way, i.e. by adhering to the same principles. The centrality of this idea to the seventeenth-century Scientific Revolution is very well documented and helps to explain why the revolutionaries tended to be Protestants rather than Catholics (unless heretics like Galileo) (Harrison 1998) . Catholics followed Aquinas in promoting a less literal reading of the Bible, in which accounts of God's creative power are to be taken as mere metaphors for something we are incapable of grasping in its totality.
When ''life'' is treated as an abstract entity subject to multiple instantiations, it is sometimes defined in functional terms, in that an artificial entity counts as living if it can pass for a natural life form, as in a Turing Test. However, increasingly the terms in which life is defined are purely formal, as in entities that evolve to a certain level of complexity and stability through self-organizing means, even if this entirely happens in virtual reality.
A good example of this purely formalist conception of life that played a remarkable role in a legal setting is Avida, a computer program designed to generate ''digital organisms'' (aka computer viruses) according to parameters for self-replication and mutation approximating those postulated by Darwinian natural selection (Lenski et al. 2003) . The fact that after a reasonable number of generations Avida generates stable complex organisms comparable to those in the natural world was offered as evidence for the existence of natural selection in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District. The defendants in this US circuit court case had offered intelligent design (ID) as an alternative to Darwinian natural selection, which they regarded as no more than a ''theory'' of the origins and maintenance of life on Earth.
In this context, it is striking that the judge who ruled against the defendants took at face value the claim that Avida instantiates natural selection, thereby obviating the need for alternative theories to be taught (especially given ID's transparently religious inspiration). Thus, even if the exact role of natural selection (vis-à-vis other evolutionary mechanisms like random genetic drift and orthogenesis) remains an open question in the history of natural organisms, its general biological validity has been substantiated by a computer program that demonstrates the efficacy of natural selection on digital organisms. Perhaps without realizing it, the judge contributed to the CT agenda by granting the same evidentiary status to evolution happening to carbon and silicon-based life forms. 7 However, the issue of convergence goes beyond accepting different bodies of evidence in support of a common theory. It would be easy to imagine an Avida-like program interfacing with other programs responsible for regulating natural organisms to produce a more authentically Darwinian sense of natural selection. Here reference is being made to the ever-present threat of computer viruses capable of paralyzing society's information and communication infrastructure, thereby jeopardizing people's livelihoods and even lives. The turn to artificial life invites us to think of this prospect as akin to releasing organic waste from laboratories and factories into public water supplies and sewage systems. In this respect, the products of computer simulations are not only just as abstract from natural phenomena, but also just as real as those of laboratory experiments. One advocate of a strong CT agenda, Ray Kurzweil, has pressed points of this kind to the US Congress as part of a renewed national security strategy (Kurzweil 2006) .
The potential policy implications of this suggested ontological convergence are enormous, but do they imply that the CT agenda is either ''reductionist'' or ''holist''? Some commentators clearly see CT as constituting a revival of the reductionist scientific research program that would portray all the objects of science as complex extensions of the fundamental particles and forces studied by physics. These commentators tend to stress the particular focus that CT, especially in its US guise, places on the nano-level of reality, emphasizing its movement towards miniaturization. In this respect, CT appears to be about ''converging downward'' to some ultimate constituents of matter. By contrast, support for the holism of the CT agenda rests on its aspirations to create an interdisciplinary or even transdisciplinary science base that addresses questions concerning the enhancement of human performance (United States) or welfare (EU) that are not adequately tackled by the individual disciplines on the CT agenda. This is, so to speak, a ''converging upward'', which is indeed how CT is frequently depicted in the founding policy documents (Schmidt 2007) .
However, neither reductionism nor holism adequately renders the distinctiveness of the CT agenda (Khushf 2004) . In particular, it would be a mistake to regard CT simply as a high-tech repetition of the issues classically raised by physical reductionism, in which all of reality is seen as a hierarchy of increasingly complex molecular structures, ranging from subatomic particles to entire ecosystems. Indeed, the verticalist imagery of ''top-down'' and ''bottom-up'' may itself be profoundly misleading as a basis for conceptualizing the policy implications of CT. The sorts of hybrid entities generated by processes associated with CT, for example, such as genetic modification, xenotransplantation and computerization, while generally quite strategic and deliberate (and hence not ''bottom-up'' in the traditional sense of ''unintended'' and ''emergent''), are devoid of any overarching sense of plan served by these interventions (and hence not ''top-down'' in the traditional sense of ''holistic'' and ''preordained'').
This feature of CT may be seen as characteristic of a trial-and-error ''bioprospecting'' mentality that was anticipated nearly two decades ago by Walter Gilbert, a Harvard professor of molecular biology, who was concerned about the intellectual future of his field, as researchers seemed to be content with testing molecular combinations, but not with producing anything theoretically more interesting (Gilbert 1991) . This implies a horizontalist imagery, whereby disciplines are linked by common methods Á broadly defined as ''modeling techniques'' Á that in the long run break down disciplinary boundaries, while reifying the methods as a shared reality. Thus, bioinformatics, originally a tool of molecular biology, becomes the thing of which molecular biology is itself an application.
In this respect, both the US and EU policy documents relating to CT may be seen as providing a focus that tries to reinvent a verticalist perspective so as to provide an easier basis for governance. Admittedly, the focus in the US and EU documents is defined somewhat differently: ''enhancement of human performance'' (United States) vs. ''improving human welfare'' (EU). However, both introduce an overarching sense of convergence on the human that need not otherwise result from the default pattern of convergences taking place in contemporary science and technology. Indeed, conserving humanity's integrity in the face of various induced convergences has become an explicit policy goal, especially amongst EU policy-makers, who distance themselves from US CT initiatives by accusing them of promoting ''transhumanism'', which, of course, the United States adamantly, and with some justification, denies. 8 Indicative of such countervailing tensions placed on the concept of the human by the CT agenda is a set of neologisms introduced by Nikolas Rose, the sociologist who co-ordinates the European Science Foundation's ''Neuroscience and Society'' network from the London School of Economics (Rose 2006 ):
(1) Biological citizenship concerns the new ways in which we are coming to relate to one other by virtue of possessing overlapping genomes that are subject to common regimes. Unlike an earlier ideology of biological determinism associated with the eugenics movement, we are now entering an age in which people will be expected to know, and hence be held responsible for, their genetic constitution. (2) Neurochemical self refers to the ways in which the parameters of human identity, including our most intimate thoughts and feelings, are coming to be defined in terms of states that are increasingly manipulable by pharmacological or surgical means. This is not quite reductionism because these developments occur at multiple levels of intervention that do not reflect a consistent ontological framework. (3) Somatic expertise is a form of knowledge that has emerged to mediate biological citizenship and the neurochemical self by extending regimes of self-management from diet, exercise and regular medical check-ups to periodic cognitive and physical ''upgrades'' by means of drugs or surgery. In this context, genetic counselling is an emerging field that envisages our bodies as long-term investment prospects. (4) Biocapital simultaneously reflects the radical functionalization and commercialization of our bodies, which has been greatly facilitated by the biological and technological feasibility of ''xenotransplantation'', i.e. the successful transfer of organic material Á often genetic Á from one species to another. The free mobility of biocapital serves to undermine the norm of bodily, and even species, integrity in ways comparable to the role that free-trade policies have played in eroding the legitimacy of the nation-state.
There will be a return to the transhumanist challenge below.
CT's fixation on nanotechnology: the resurgence of the chemical worldview CT's fixation on nanotechnology is best seen in terms of the quest for the most finely grained level of reality at which humans can strategically intervene to re-engineer themselves and their environments. A historical frame of reference is provided by the medieval alchemists, who spoke of ''minima materia'', which is sometimes mistranslated as atoms, or ultimate units of matter. In fact, the alchemists were seeking the smallest bits of matter that retain their functional properties Á largely in the context of medical practice. Homoeopathy continues this tradition, especially if one thinks of the serial dilution of toxic materials as a crude prototype of the scaling-down of somatic interventions to the nanolevel. Nanotechnology's stress on the ''functional'' is an anthropocentric concept that presupposes an understanding of the arrangement and movement of matter in terms of their instrumentality in bringing about humanly relevant ends. Since the general history of science tends to be told through the history of physics, it is common to treat scientists who in the modern age persisted in regarding relations of Newtonian mass and force in purely functional terms Á say, as ''energy'' Á as having been conceptually mistaken. Thus, Joseph Priestley, the polymath chemist who first experimentally isolated oxygen in the 1770s is not normally credited with its discovery because he thought he had invented a technique for purifying air and water (which, of course, oxygen does), not a fundamental element of nature. Indeed, a convenient way of differentiating the histories of physics and chemistry in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is that chemistry retained this concern for minima materia, whereas physics abandoned it in favor of a search for ultimate units as such, regardless of their functional character. Indeed, the rise of the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics in the 1920s suggested that ultimate physical reality eludes any ordinary sense of causation. To be sure, nuclear fission, an outcome of physics'' search for the ultimate units of matter, proved an innovative basis for both maintaining and destroying civilized life by exploiting properties of matter that can only be called, respectively, ''pre-'' and ''anti-'' functional. By contrast, CT aims to return science squarely to the functionalist fold.
In the first section, it was observed that much has been made of the emergence of nanotechnology as a re-branding exercise for chemistry. This discipline first lost ontological status at the start of the twentieth century, after having been reduced to atomic physics, and by the start of the twenty-first century had lost its sociological status Á albeit this time alongside physics Á as enrolments dropped and departments closed in the First World War. At the dawn of the twentieth century, the two disciplines were on an equal epistemological and ethical footing as sources of general natural-philosophical worldviews. On the public level, the differences between physicists and chemists appeared irreconcilable: the former concerned with the pure and the latter with the practical. However, they also waged a protracted war over the reality of atoms, which the chemists denied (except as a theoretical fiction), but which the physicists eventually proved, with Einstein's explanation of Brownian motion. After that 1905 discovery, chemistry was increasingly seen as the branch of physics that deals with complex molecules and their applications.
The difference between the physical and chemical worldviews may be summarized in Table 1 (see also Fuller 2000, chap. 2) . The physical and chemical worldviews can be regarded as complementary, especially from a theological standpoint. The physical worldview draws a clear distinction between God and humans, so that there are final barriers to our ability to predict and control nature. We aim to discover that beyond which we cannot turn to our own advantage. By contrast, the chemical worldview, much more heretically, envisages humans playing, if not replacing, the divine creator. Here matter is treated not as an insuperable barrier, but as raw material to be molded Á with more or less difficulty Á to serve human needs. What matters is not the ultimacy of matter per se, but its moment of ultimate plasticity, the so-called edge of uncertainty that the nano-scale promises to provide.
This shift from the physical to the chemical worldview has profound metaphysical implications. Before the twentieth century, it was common to distinguish ''natural'' and ''nominal'' kinds, i.e. things identified in terms of what they are vs. what we name them, a Biblical distinction that in its modern form goes back to John Locke's adaptation of Thomas Aquinas. ''Nominal kinds'' were said to be arbitrary because the things assigned the same names would not necessarily share anything deeper (or ''essential'') than our interest in treating them the same way. In that sense, all kinds are at least nominal and the question is whether they are natural as well. (Locke shifted the burden of proof to those who claimed to have named natural kinds.) However, by the end of the twentieth century, this sharp distinction between natural and nominal kinds yielded to more fluid distinctions based on the degree to which we can bend things to our will. Hence, Roy Bhaskar (1975) wrote of the difference between ''transitive'' and ''intransitive'' dimensions of reality, and Ian Hacking (1998) of ''interactive'' vs. ''indifferent'' kinds, which in both cases roughly corresponded to the objects of the human vs. the natural sciences. However, it may be more appropriate to distinguish between virtual and real kinds, the latter understood as multiple realizations of the former. 9 This marks a radical shift in the ontological focus of scientific inquiry. In particular, ''nature'' is cast as only a subset of all possible realizations (i.e. only part of the ''real''), as opposed to something inherently ''other'' or ''independent'' of whatever humans might name or construct. Once again this perspective is familiar from the chemical worldview, in which, say, the difference between ''natural'' and ''synthetic'' fibers lies entirely in the history of their production and their functional properties, but not in terms of the metaphysical priority of one over the other, since both the ''natural'' and the ''synthetic'' are composed of the same fundamental stuff Á and the latter may indeed count as an improvement of the former. By extension, ''mind'' and ''life'' lose the metaphysical mystique associated with their natural origins and come to be assessed simply in terms of the properties possessed by their realizations Á be they human, carbon-based, silicon-based or some cyborgian mixture.
Starkly put, in this third metaphysical phase, a thing's identity is no longer constrained by its history, not even its Darwinian evolutionary history. Thus, as we get better at pharmaceutically manipulating genetic expression and neural circuitry with an eye to long-term improvements Á be it through direct incorporation into the next generation's genetic potential or less directly through regular corrective medical interventions (cf. vaccinations) Á the hollower will seem the concern raised in the following short item:
Human enhancement beyond evolution ''If it is such a good idea, why has evolution not built us that way?'' That is the question two philosophers say we must ask before we attempt to enhance our human capabilities.
We already enhance our minds with drugs such as Ritalin and Modafinil, our sexual performance with Viagra and our immune systems with vaccines. These are nothing compared with what might be on the way, from brain implants for a better memory to genetic modifications for sports performance (New Scientist, 13 May 2006, p. 32).
Before we consider forging ahead with these technologies, we need to consider why we haven't already evolved that way, say Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg of the Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford. This will allow us to identify when it is feasible for us to outdo nature, they say, and when it is not.
Before anyone considers giving humans greater brain power, for example, they should first show that the only reason we don't already have more mental capacity is that the resulting energy demands would have been a disadvantage for our hunter-gatherer ancestors when food was scarce. Now food is more plentiful, it might be all right to forge ahead, but if there is no convincing guarantee that this enhancement no longer poses a problem, it might be wiser to steer clear of it. ''The human organism is enormously complex'', says Bostrom. ''If we go in blindly and change things at random, we are likely to mess up''. He presented the idea last week at the Transvision conference in Helsinki, Finland.
This short article, which appeared in the New scientist in 2006, is stressed because caution with respect to human enhancement policies is being urged on evolutionary grounds by a most unlikely source, namely, two intellectual leaders of the transhumanist movement.
would seem that even transhumanists Á at least the academically respectable ones Á continue to trade on an old rhetoric of evolutionary ''anchoring'' that harks back to a time Á from the late nineteenth to the late twentieth centuries Á when the ancient ancestry of our genetic traits (e.g. vestiges of the ''reptilian'' or ''primate'' brain) was associated with their relatively strategic impermeability. 11 However, as a matter of fact, as transhumanists would be the first to point out, we are gradually discovering ways of re-engineering processes and properties that originally developed over millions of years. Even from an evolutionary standpoint, there is no reason why biological traits that have been around for aeons cannot be successfully changed overnight, provided environments exist where individuals possessing the new traits prove ''adaptive'' (i.e. reproduce themselves). To be sure, this is much easier said than done. Indeed, the extreme prospects of genetic and neural re-engineering Á both in terms of risks and benefits Á revisit the classic questions of social engineering. However, addressing them adequately has less to do with respecting the deep past than with reconstructing today's socio-technical world to render it hospitable for any such biologically modified beings. The nostalgic appeal to an evolutionary naturalism simply obscures what is, in effect, a straightforward political decision about the care with which we project future generations. 12 A good way to encapsulate the foregoing three-stage metaphysical transformation in what kinds of things there are is to match them to the three main phases in the history of genetics, with CT bringing the final stage to fruition (Table 2 ).
Biology as a vehicle for human enhancement Á social science's (relatively) hidden history and possible future 13 Despite considerable controversy surrounding the term ''human enhancement'' as a goal of CT, with the EU equally suspicious and sceptical of US aspirations, such disagreements are, nevertheless, less over the desirability of enhancement per se than the form it takes. As we have seen, ''enhancement'' promises that individuals will enjoy greater consumer choice, but also longer economic productivity, thereby enabling a reduction of state welfare burdens. It would seem, then, that there is something for everyone across the politicalÁ economic spectrum.
There is a long history of treating genetic variability in competitive terms, as played out over successive generations of socially delineated ''races'', ''clans'' and ''families''. The interest in enhancing human performance is ultimately rooted in the palpable differences in achievement that emerge from examining these various lines of human descent. In particular, those people from modest origins often pick themselves up, but never reach the top without resorting to violence, and then only temporarily, whereas those people who start on top often regress to a position of mediocrity, if not outright degeneracy, unless they prove to be of sufficiently strong ''character''. However, it has long been thought that some targeted intervention might be able to alter both these tendencies Á notably the first major work of Western political philosophy, Plato's Republic. Whereas most subsequent theories of politics have concentrated on preventing the rot from setting in (e.g. through constitutional checks and balances and various incentives to prevent corruption), Plato was distinctive in trying to raise the bottom by identifying promising offspring from all classes and subjecting them to special training over the course of several decades to enhance their latent potential for leadership. If Freud held that a child's future was sealed by the age of five, Plato contended that it was around that age that the child's nascent responses to the world could be channeled for maximum social benefit.
Though lacking anything like a modern theory of genetics, but possessing a keen sense of Greek history, Plato was struck by the unreliability of family background as a predictor of desirable qualities like leadership. Nevertheless, he believed that a stable social order requires just such a belief in the heritability of achievement. The value of heritability lay in the security one feels from anticipating what people are likely to do under normal circumstances, given their past, which then allows their acts to be encouraged or prevented. Plato spoke of this as a ''noble lie'', the so-called ''myth of the metals'', the quasi-racist, caste-like basis of a stable social order, which justified segregating the best from the rest. However, this folk theory needed to be supplemented by a more esoteric theory that recognized the inevitable uncertainties that resulted from people of perhaps fixed genetic make-up encountering circumstances, themselves perhaps separately predictable, but beyond the control of those encountering them.
The big difference between how Plato and we think about the prospects for human enhancement is that, unlike Plato, who conceptualized the issue in terms of decisions taken about individual lives, the CT agenda operates at two steps removed, selecting research trajectories likely to result in enhancement innovations that, at least in principle, would be available to the full range of inhabitants of nations promoting the CT agenda. To be sure, which particular individuals end up benefiting from these innovations is left open in a way Plato would not approve of. To a large extent, this difference in approach reflects Plato's greater certainty about the consequences of his decisions. He believed that the requisite knowledge was already available, but that people were normally too self-interested to be trusted to make the right decisions. Thus, Plato established the Academy as a school for aspirant philosopher-kings, who would be trained to adopt the universal standpoint as their own default basis for taking decisions. To be sure, Plato regarded this as a difficult task, requiring several decades of matriculation Á but not as the commission of specialized research.
Plato's folk theory of the heritability of achievement, the ''myth of the metals'', was revisited with new empirical vigor in the late nineteenth century by Darwin's cousin, Francis Galton, who coined the term ''eugenics'' for the project of tracing family lineages in order to identify, and cultivate, lines of achievement. This project was politically attractive to an emerging liberalÁsocialist sensibility, associated with the Fabian Society in the UK, which, on the one hand, was keen to remove the hereditary privilege of the House of Lords, which was typically based on the achievement of one ancient ancestor, who turned out to have been an exception in a family history whose members had regressed over successive generations; and, on the other, feared that the advent of majoritarian democracy would swamp the efforts and aspirations of the talented, unless they reproduced themselves in sufficient numbers.
Although the underlying theory of genetics changed radically over the 80 or so years that saw the likes of Galton, Karl Pearson, Ronald Fisher and Julian Huxley advance versions of what is often called ''positive eugenics'' (as opposed to the ''negative eugenics'' associated primarily with culling, as practised in extremis by the Nazis), they all agreed that not everything was worth preserving in the human gene pool simply because the gene pool was ''human''. In this respect, these thinkers accepted the premise of all versions of modern evolutionary theory that species are not fixed essences (e.g. specially created by God), but mutable sites for the collection and transmission of genetic material.
The history of eugenics is relevant to the project of human enhancement because it establishes the point of view from which human beings are to be regarded, not as ends in themselves, but as means for the production of benefits, be it to the economy or to ''society'' in a diffuse understanding of the word. The Abrahamic or Kantian idea of humanity as a species-being possessing its own unique integrity and autonomy (aka ''dignity'') is largely relegated to ethical ''side constraints'' for the conduct of research and ''precautions'' related to anticipated negative consequences of such research and its applications.
14 The shift strongly resembles the one that occurred to the idea of producer in classical political economy. In authors from Aquinas to Locke, a ''producer'' was the worker through whose creative transformation value was given to nature. It was associated with humanity's spark of divinity. However, by the early nineteenth century, ''producer'' had come to designate the workplace manager whose organization of workers enabled the efficient flow of goods and services. In other words, a producer became a human whose job was to transform other humans, as if they, too, were simply part of nature. An awareness of this semantic transformation underlay Marx's early critique of capitalism, especially in terms of the alienation of the worker from his labor as the abstract factor of ''productivity'' that requires the supplementation, if not outright replacement, of people with machines and other artificial arrangements. 15 The CT agenda, especially in the NBIC form promoted by the 2002 NSF document, harks back to this early interpretation of social science, one that predates the field's separation into distinct disciplines or, for that matter, its clear differentiation from the natural sciences. It is a vision most recognizable as Auguste Comte's original version of ''sociology'' as the overall development of science brought to self-consciousness, as humans are finally incorporated as proper objects of scientific inquiry, thereby providing the site for the integration and collective self-governance of all the sciences. Convergence on the ideal social order on a global scale would presumably follow soon. A slightly less grandiose, less theoretically-laden and more policy-oriented precedent of this vision actually came close to the horizons of today's CT agendas. The reference here is to the 1814 proposal by Comte's mentor, Count Henri de Saint-Simon, The reorganization of European society. Saint-Simon held that, regardless of Napoleon's personal fate, he had succeeded in consolidating Europe as an idea that could be taken forward (by others) as one grand corporate entity, to be managed by a scientifically trained cadre, modeled on the civil engineers trained at the Ecole Polytechnique.
A striking feature of Saint-Simon's vision, which is relevant for our purposes, is his generalization of Adam Smith's hostility to the barriers that owners, and laws governing ownership, placed on the productive use of capital. The form of capital Smith mainly had in mind was land, whose owners could derive income by charging rents for simple occupancy. Saint-Simon's CT-relevant innovation was proposing that ownership of one's body was the main barrier to increased productivity Á what is now euphemistically called ''underutilized human capital''. By analogy, Saint-Simon objected to the idea that individuals were entitled to certain basic goods simply by virtue of self-possession. To be sure, by the late eighteenth century, ideas of liberty as an ''inalienable'' right premised on the ''dignity'' of the person had become the standard by which political regimes were judged and on the basis of which the American and French Revolutions were justified. In this respect, Saint-Simon was a ''counter-revolutionary'' thinker. However, from the standpoint of CT, he was ahead of his time.
The radical assumption behind Saint-Simon's proposal was that possession does not entail competence. Property ownership had traditionally been required for political participation because it was assumed that owners had to be able to manage their holdings effectively in order to prosper, i.e. they displayed on a small scale the sort of judgment required on a large scale. This line of reasoning was extended to self-ownership in the late eighteenth century to incorporate tradesmen and professionals who might not be landholders, but whose gainful self-employment revealed their competence. Saint-Simon's proposal gave a perverse twist to this development by shifting personal competence from an ''input'' to an ''output'' measure Á i.e. from presumptive possession to revealed productivity. In short, Saint-Simon legitimized the idea that, on a show of competence, not only might political power be granted to those who previously lacked it (such as tradesmen and professionals), but the converse also applied, so that erring landholders might lose the right to dispose freely of their property. He notoriously made the point by arguing that France would lose its civilization and prosperity if it lost its scientists and artists, but that nothing would change if it lost its priests and aristocrats. It was this assessment that led Marx to deride the rentier class for its promotion of ''rural idiocy''.
The nineteenth century made the shift to Saint-Simon's perspective increasingly plausible, as the state came to present society as a corporate ''national'' entity with a life and purpose above and beyond those of its constitutive individuals. The administration of this corporate entity was entrusted to a bureaucracy Á which Saint-Simon envisaged as consisting of industrialists and technocrats Á with the power to redistribute the nation's wealth so as to ensure maximum productivity. Recall, once again, that 1814 was before the natural and social sciences were clearly differentiated. This bears on what ''redistribution'' might have meant. It is now easy to imagine Saint-Simon as having been concerned with redistribution only at the level of material wealth, i.e. with the state's ability to tax and spend. However, he was also interested in the redistribution of ''sentiment'', largely through changes in what, after Claude Bernard, came to be called the ''internal'' (i.e. the organism's physiology) and ''external'' environments responsible for their generation and maintenance. As we shall see later, this aspiration establishes his relevance to the 2002 NSF report.
Saint-Simon Á and certainly Comte and sociology's academic founder, Emile Durkheim Á saw the matter in terms of ''moral education'', which in practice meant reprogramming each generation's brains to undo the misconceptions (or ''ideology'') instilled by religious instruction, not least the idea of a mental life independent of both the natural and social order, the so-called seat of the soul, the pseudoscience of which was ''psychology''. Whilst these thinkers thought of reorienting brains to society largely in terms of altering the ''external environment'', they certainly aspired to intervene more directly in the brain. Indeed, an often neglected feature of nineteenth century debates over the foundations of the social sciences Á then often called the ''moral sciences'' Á is the enthusiasm for a positivistically upgraded science of medicine to become the basis for a unified policy science that might pass for ''sociology''. CT, especially in its NSF guise, should be seen as revisiting this prospect at a time when the differences between the natural and social sciences Á not least the biology/sociology interface Á have begun to lose their institutional and intellectual salience (Fuller 2006) .
Here it is worth observing that the biology/sociology interface remained porous as long as the so-called Weismann Doctrine was not in effect. 16 In other words, as long as biologists found no reason to think that physical changes to a current generation of organisms would have long-term effects on its offspring, it became convenient to distinguish biology from sociology in terms of a focus on genotypic vs. phenotypic changes Á the former change bearing on the latter, but not vice versa. To be sure, the Weismann Doctrine is alive and well amongst evolutionary psychologists who explain the limited variance of human sociocultural responses to their physical environment in terms of genotypic anchoring. However, the promise of CT's capacity to switch genes on and off and otherwise produce permanent effects on the genome in a single generation suggests the resurgence of a sensibility closer to Saint-Simon and Comte, both of whom were sympathetic to Lamarckian views of evolution.
In its pre-scientific ''therapeutic'' mode, medicine was largely concerned with preparing ''patients'' Á literally passive beings Á as they pass through the natural course of their lives. However, the nineteenth century came to see infirmity and death as enemies of the body politic to be overcome through regular and systematic medical treatment, functioning as a kind of micro-level national security system. This change in sensibility is normally attributed to the late eighteenth-century physiologist Xavier Bichat, 17 who figured as a major saint in Comte's positivist revision of the holy calendar. As mediated by the founder of French experimental medicine, Claude Bernard, Bichat's idea passed into the work of Durkheim, who quite explicitly treated deviance as moral pathology (Hirst 1975) .
Moreover, this view was by no means restricted to France. In Germany, as early as 1855 Rudolf Virchow argued in favor of medicine as the scientific basis of the law, calling for medical doctors to function in a proactive capacity, akin to the newly-established legal institution of the police. According to this line of thought, warding off disease (especially epidemics) was like averting crime. Both rob society of its productivity, but they differ in the physical levels on which the infractions occur, with medical doctors operating at a finer-grained level than the police (Saracci 2001) . Although inadequate to enable the convergence of the disciplines of medicine and law, strands of this line of thought have continued as, say, the basis for child vaccination campaigns, in which negligent parents can become subject to prosecution. Now, we might not be far from the day when the right to give birth requires prior consultation with a genetic counsellor who apprises the pregnant woman of both her options and her liability for their consequences (Rose 2006) .
In short, were he teleported across the two centuries that divide him from us, SaintSimon could recognize the following slogan, taken from the NSF document, as a more advanced version of what he had advocated. A chart of the relevant translations has been supplied (Table 3) :
If the Cognitive Scientists can think it, the Nano people can build it, the Bio people can implement it, and the IT people can monitor and control it. (Roco and Bainbridge 2002a, p. 13) The applied epistemologist Jean-Pierre Dupuy has argued that a unique feature of the nano-driven character of the CT agenda is that proposals have been made for the normative regulation of scientific research Á sometimes resulting in explicit guidelines Á long before such research actually exists, let alone has borne socially relevant fruit. 18 Indeed, such an ''anticipatory governance'' orientation has become the main framing concept of the largest social science initiative associated with the US CT agenda, the ''Nanotechnology in Society'' network centered in Arizona State University under the leadership of David Guston and Daniel Sarewitz. It would seem natural to translate a concept like anticipatory governance into the language of ethics, perhaps as an extension of the ''precautionary principle'' used in ecological discourses. However, this fails to capture the proactive character of the lines of inquiry pursued under the concept, which more strongly resembles public relations or even marketing.
Two aspects of these ''anticipatory'' activities are relevant here, one from the science side and the other from the public side. First, practitioners of certain branches of materials science and chemical engineering Á if not chemistry more generally Á have increasingly identified their field of research as ''nanotechnology''. This has enhanced the sense of forward momentum to nano-driven fields in citation indexes that depend on selfcharacterization for their keywords. 19 Second, social scientists in both the United States and EU have been interested not only in surveying public opinion on current developments in nanotechnology, but also anticipating the reception of future nano-based products. 20 The latter, whether intentionally or not, serves to acclimatize citizens, in the company of their peers, to whatever nano-driven changes might be on the horizon.
These ''nano-futures'' are presented both live in ''science cafés'' (i.e. the American version of the ''café scientifique'') and in cyberspace through wiki-media. The scenarios are initially vetted by the relevant scientists so as to be sufficiently plausible for people to take them seriously. In social psychology, this strategy is often dubbed ''inoculation'', the suggestion being that by allowing people to spend time thinking and talking about extreme or pure cases of a potential threat, you have laid the groundwork for the acceptance of a less virulent version. At the very least, you have normalized the idea in their minds. Of course, at the same time such scenarios lower one's guard to the potential harms caused by nanotechnology, they also raise one's expectations that its social benefits are forthcoming. However this, too, may be interpreted along Janus-faced lines. The anticipatory acceptance of nanotechnology may lead, on the one hand, to an anti-science backlash if sufficient benefits are not forthcoming or, on the other, to a willingness to interpret all manner of marginal nano-driven improvements as indicative of greater things to come.
For Dupuy, these nano-futures are high-tech versions of the performative, or ''selffulfilling'', character of prophecy, whereby a notional preference for a certain future, which the prophet channels as the voice of God or the scenario elicits from the participants, serves as groundwork for what, in retrospect, will enable people to say that they were prepared for what eventually happened. Of course, strictly speaking, self-fulfilling prophecies need not turn out to be true, but the import of taking the prophecy seriously is to think in terms of tendencies in the present that would indeed be responsible for the prophecy coming true, were it to come true. Similarly, as people become accustomed to thinking in terms of nano-futures, although the relevant scientific breakthroughs that would turn these scenarios into realities may not happen any more quickly, people will be primed Á and inclined to provide further groundwork (in terms of funding, ''anticipatory governance'' regimes, etc.) Á to recognize and incorporate the realization of the nanofutures when (and if) they happen. One feature of this ''priming'' of the future is worth highlighting, as it bears on the transhumanist futures that, as will be seen in the next section, some enthusiastic bioethicists have begun to project. The historical appeal of Lamarck's theory of evolution lay in the prospect of improving oneself through deliberate effort, the result of which would have continuing genetic consequences. The panoply of proposed CT-based enhancement strategies promises to deliver on at least this part of Lamarck's vision. However, the justifiability of this optimism depends on how one identifies the nature of the relevant interventions.
Bioethicists and others hoping for a neo-Lamarckian revival tend to talk about genes as a population geneticist would, i.e. as bearers of socially significant traits Á as if that captured the character of our interventions in the genome. Thus, thinking experiments to test our intuitions about the morality of enhancement typically go like this: ''Suppose a treatment was available to switch on a gene that would enable your child to cognitively mature at such a rate that he could avoid primary school altogether''. The problem with this scenario is not that no one currently faces such a problem, but rather that progress in our ability to intervene at the nano-level of life Á and to monitor the relevant consequences Á is best understood in terms of how molecular biology thinks about the gene, which has to do with the propensities of various protein configurations in a given biotic environment, such as the human body. As the leading historian of the field has put the matter:
How is gene defined: population geneticists follow traits, whereas molecular biologists follow protein: ''for the molecular biologist, a gene is a fragment of DNA that codes for a protein. For a population geneticist, it is a factor transmitted from generation to generation, which by its variations can confer selective advantage (positive or negative) on the individuals carrying it'' (Morange 1998, p. 249) .
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So we are certainly getting better at, say, gene-switching or brain-boosting, but our social categories do not naturally map either the causes or the consequences of such interventions. We are basically just learning how to manipulate our proteins better. In this respect, a society that encourages the study and application of CT-oriented research is forced to conceive of the activity as an opportunity to use our own bodies as sites for biomedical experimentation and bioprospecting. This is not said to discredit transhumanist ambitions, but to alert people to the attendant changes in the sense of self, as well as our relationship to others, in what amounts to a scientific license for risk-seeking behavior of the most fundamental order. Transhumanists routinely commit this category mistake because they are so keen to demonstrate the feasibility of overcoming traditional ''natural'' boundaries by artificial means Á even when these means are sociologically-speaking either irrelevant or deleterious, so it seems.
''Enhancing evolution'': the unspoken normative dimension of the CT agenda John Harris, editor of the Journal of medical ethics and Professor of Bioethics at the University of Manchester School of Law, is probably the most intellectually challenging moral philosopher writing in Britain today. He has recently published Enhancing evolution, based on a series of lectures given at Oxford's James Martin Institute for Science and Civilization in 2006, which presents the most systematic case to date for the value of artificially enhancing the human condition along broadly CT lines (Harris 2007) . Although Harris does not explicitly endorse a ''transhumanist'' ideology, he admits that the liberal policies he supports on enhancement may eventually result in a species-change that might properly be called ''transhumanist'' (ibid., pp. 37Á8) .
At the outset some other caveats need to be delivered about Harris's argument. Harris defends ''enhancing evolution'' on neo-Darwinian and utilitarian grounds. However, one might start from neo-Darwinian and utilitarian premises and project a rather different future from Harris's. In this respect, a conspicuous omission from his otherwise wideranging treatment of actual and potential opponents is Peter Singer, the only philosopher whose global influence exceeds Harris's on bioethical matters. Singer shares Harris's starting point, but arrives at significantly different conclusions. Much more than Singer, Harris takes a liberalÁindividualist stance towards utilitarianism, as if Bentham were simply a natural extension of Locke. He interprets the utilitarian maxim ''the greatest good for the greatest number'' as something for everyone to decide for themselves, as long as it does not prevent others from doing the same. An alternative reading of the utilitarian maxim, one closer to Singer and more in the original spirit of Bentham's maxim, would deal with matters in a more aggregate fashion. After all, utilitarianism is, strictly speaking, a philosophy dedicated to the maximization of social welfare, and hence not a priori committed to the bodily integrity Á let alone indefinite enhancement Á of individuals, whose value is mainly seen as sites for registering society's pleasures and pains.
This subtle, but important point was brilliantly satirized a decade ago by the political theorist Steven Lukes (1996) in the novel, The curious enlightenment of Professor Caritat. Lukes envisaged a utopia called ''Utilitaria'', a land whose motto was ''From Welfare to Farewell'', as citizens came to think of their legacy in terms of the body parts they could bequeath to fitter specimens, once their own bodies exhibited diminishing productivity returns on biomedical investments. It is easy to ridicule such a sensibility, but it actually captures a world in which people have come to realize that they are all made of the same stuff, given some largely accidental marginal differences.
If anything, from a neo-Darwinian standpoint, Lukes's Utilitaria is much too tame. One could further argue that its regime needs to be extended to all animals, whose genomes, after all, differ from human ones by no more than 5%. At this point we enter Peter Singer's (1993) bioethical paradise, which would turn the welfare state into a guarantor of the efficient transfer of genetic material for enabling the maximal productivity of the widest range of species. This would amount to treating genes as pure capital (or ''biocapital'', to use Nikolas Rose's term) in search of greater mobility, with humans as just one of its many transient species-bearers. The nightmare scenario, then, would not be the Marxist one that humans might be replaced by technology once their productivity flags, but rather the Darwinist one that particular humans might need to be culled to ensure an efficient division of labor amongst species (aka symbiosis) in a sustainable ecology. Nazi Germany was the first society that claimed to act on the basis of this principle, which resulted in the ''culling'' of millions of Jews (see also Fuller 2006) .
Harris disappointingly fails to come to grips with this alternative future that might easily follow from his own neo-Darwinian and utilitarian premises. He avoids discussing not only Singer, but also more general animal rights, android rights or, for that matter, any broader ecological orientation Á including the physical side-effects of nano-based biotechnologies that in the future may be used, say, to regenerate our organs or cleanse our bloodstream. Harris's ethical universe is resolutely anthropocentric and relatively innocent of concerns about cyborgs or any other witting or unwitting hybridization of the human condition. However, the most touching feature of Harris's naiveté is his reliance on Darwin's authority.
What makes Harris's faith in Darwin touching is that he retains so much of the unfounded humanist sensibility of Darwin's early followers. Like them, Harris cautiously welcomes transhumanism as humanism brought to self-realization Á not as a fundamental discarding of the human as an altogether inferior form of life. For a glimpse into the limits to Harris' imagination, consider this bland statement:
It is difficult, for me at least, to see any powerful principled reasons to remain human if we can create creatures, or evolve into creatures, fundamentally ''better'' than ourselves. It is salutary to remember that we humans are the products of an evolutionary process that has fundamentally changed ''our'' nature. (Harris 2007, p. 40) Harris, like many of today's so-called secular humanists, still harbors late nineteenthcentury hopes that evolution ultimately converges upon humanity's utopian fantasies. Yet, any substantial realization of these fantasies requires deviating from the default trajectory of evolution, at least as conceptualized in Darwinian terms, i.e. as a process lacking both knowledge and hope of the sort of fine-grained understanding of heredity that now provides prima facie plausibility to Harris's arguments for enhancement. We tend to forget that, unlike Gregor Mendel, Darwin's belatedly-recognized contemporary and the founder of modern genetics, Darwin himself stressed the disanalogy between the workings of natural selection and ''artificial selection'', that is, the collected practices of animal and plant breeding that have informed agricultural progress over the centuries. As Darwin believed that natural selection would always trump our best efforts at artificial selection, he was relatively pessimistic about humanity's capacity to relieve the more miserable aspects of our collective existence, other than by inhibiting the reproduction of those suffering from demonstrable genetic deficiency. Harris thus fails to realize that Darwin's true descendants are to be found amongst defenders of the precautionary principle, whom he humorously dismisses for their extreme risk-averse policy perspective.
Harris' naive confidence in Darwin's support is exemplified in the ''retro-futurist'' image that graces the cover of Enhancing evolution, i.e. the flexed arm muscle of a comicbook Superman. In the mid-twentieth century, the phrase ''making better people'' did indeed conjure up the idea of beings that were excellent versions of our current selves, as in the case of Superman, whose irradiated body expedited genetic change in generally desirable directions. 22 However, nowadays transhumanism's normative horizons veer towards what has been called ableism (i.e. able-ism), which aims at the indefinite promotion of various abilities, regardless of the species identity of their possessors. 23 Ableists know enough about modern biology to realize that, left to its own devices, an accelerated version of natural selection is unlikely to result in creatures that we would be proud to call our own successor species. While evidence of common descent would no doubt remain in the genetic make-up and even the morphology of these later creatures, abilities valued in earlier creatures might well have been eliminated due to intervening changes to the selection environment. In other words, for a pro-enhancement policy not to appear Sisyphean, one must believe that Mendel trumps Darwin Á that artificial selection can beat natural selection. A consequence of this belief is that one might continue to value the indefinite promotion of, say, cognitive ability, but come to realize that, given changes to the natural world, cognitive ability is best conveyed by creatures that significantly differ from our own biological make-up, but whose creation is nevertheless within the range of our technological powers. One might regard such ''enhancements'' in ontologically modest terms, so that our cognitively superior successors look like us, or at least share the same material substratum Á that is, they are carbon-based. The prospects for horizontal gene transfer, which revisits the Lamarckian idea that our offspring might be decisively affected by physical changes in our own lifetimes, would likely prove a first step in that direction. 24 To enhance cognitive ability in an oxygen-deprived environment (assuming massive air pollution), for example, the solution may be gene therapy based on some non-human species already able to get around this problem, from which our offspring might then also benefit. 25 Yet, of course, given more radical changes to the physical environment, the relevant sense of enhancement might move away from a carbon material substratum altogether to a more resilient silicon one enabling consciousness to be downloaded into computer androids. Put bluntly, Harris fails to see that a natural extension of his argument is a license to write us out of existence by disaggregating ''the human'' into a set of capacities, each of which can be assessed and extended separately without the others that have been associated with the human condition in evolutionary history. Thus, the ableist aims to make good on an assertion that was originally treated as highly controversial when the UK bioethicist Jonathan Glover (1984) uttered it a quarter-century ago: ''Not just any aspect of present human nature is worth preserving''.
At the very least, under the ableist regime Harris countenances, the distinction between ''abled'' and ''disabled'' would be both relativized and modularized. This, in turn, would tend to expand the definition of ''disabled'' from its traditional meaning (i.e. physical disability) to include a broader, but vaguer category like ''disadvantaged'' (aka ''noncompetitive'' or ''non-adaptive''), into which individuals may fall not because of any change to their bodies but, on the contrary, simply because their bodies fail to change in accordance with the norms of what Nikolas Rose calls ''somatic expertise''. Thus, people may come to think of themselves as ''always already disabled'', that is, on the verge of falling behind in a social world where regular neurochemical upgradings are expected as a precondition for adequate performance. 26 The first stirrings of this general problem have already entered public perception in controversies concerning the use of drugs to enhance competitive athletic and academic performance. The political responses so far suggest that this feature of the ableist agenda may well be subject to considerable regulation, but it is very unlikely that its advance will be stopped altogether. 27 Why is Harris blind to the prospect of enhancement? Despite his progressive rhetoric, with his opponents Á including Jü rgen Habermas, Francis Fukuyama, Leon Kass (George W. Bush's bioethics tsar) and the Harvard political theorist Michael Sandel Á Harris shares a belief in an ontologically robust idea of human nature. Harris looks progressive only because of the primitive state of the most controversial enhancement technologies. This means he can have his cake and eat it. He can beckon towards a transhumanist future, but for now his hardest cases concern the prospect of humans living indefinitely in more or less their current embodiment (Harris 2007, pp. 67Á68) . To be sure, such cases raise interesting metaphysical questions, given the long-standing link that Western culture has forged between the meaning of life and the inevitability of death. However, it will not be long before advances in enhancement technologies broaden the metaphysical issues to include what the medieval scholastics called ''the problem of universals'', i.e. how can the same form be communicated in different configurations of matter? More concretely: how would one determine whether an entity substantially different in material composition from today's human is still human Á or at least sufficiently human to merit the value normally invested in humans?
Preliminary conclusions
One should not think of the disciplines involved in the CT agenda as somehow driven by their separate paradigms towards convergence, which, once fully realized, could then be applied for the benefit of society. On the contrary, the relevant sciences are pursuing many different agendas at once, progress in which is currently propelled by the client base Á not least its patience in waiting for the relevant breakthroughs that would serve its interests. This state of affairs has rendered biology a financially successful, but intellectually incoherent discipline, which philosophers sometimes dignify by saying that the science operates with a ''disunified ontology'' (Dupré 1993) . Thus, people who call themselves ''biologists'' are driven, on the one hand, to search for ''deep'' explanations for social traits already present in species that preceded it in evolution and, on the other, to reverse that implied history through micro-level manipulations of the sort associated with CT. Under these circumstances, overlaps in the client bases probably better explain any existing tendencies towards convergence than some philosophically-inspired notion that independent lines of free inquiry tend to converge on a common truth. In this respect, states and inter-state bodies Á as long as they remain major players in the funding and regulation of scientific research Á are in an unusually good position to provide direction at both the level of theory and application.
A realistic starting point for policy is not a generalized scepticism towards the promised enhancement technologies associated with CT, but the expectation that many will come to pass, albeit perhaps in diminished form. In any case, a minimal state or inter-state response would be to ensure that current socio-economic inequalities are not exacerbated by the introduction of enhancement technologies in a market environment. Of course, a more proactive policy would be preferred, especially one prepared quickly to incorporate enhancement technologies into established social welfare systems, while monitoring the consequences of mass adoption and restricting access outside those recognized systems. However, here two obstacles need to be overcome.
The first obstacle is the principle objection from a broadly natural law standpoint about the violation of the human being. Rather than giving the religious origins of this concern a free pass, as a gesture to political tolerance it will become increasingly important to contest the empirical basis for its concerns. Is everything about the human body sacrosanct? If so, why? These matters have been seriously contested within the theological traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and so there is no reason to think that the most vocal and perhaps stereotypical religiously inspired objectors to enhancement are representative of all considered opinion.
However, a more substantial long-term problem is the element of risk that individuals will need to assume as new enhancement technologies are made generally available. The increasing concern with protecting human subjects during clinical trials and other experimental settings merely offloads the difficult question of the conditions under which a proposed enhancement is considered sufficiently safe to be made available en masse. It is unlikely that there will ever be clear answer. Indeed, there are likely to be major failures along the way, though hopefully not on the scale associated with faulty eugenics policies in the past. Nevertheless, states and inter-state bodies will need to provide some sort of welfare safety-net or insurance against the risks that individuals will obviously undertake Á and be encouraged to undertake Á by subjecting themselves to enhancement regimes.
Notes

